

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ACDA-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-13

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 PRS-01

SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00

USIE-00 INRE-00 HA-05 CU-04 /085 W

-----021049 171403Z /50

O P 171200Z NOV 77

FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3597

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY

USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 8105

FOR EUR/RPM, EUR/SOV/AND ACDA FROM USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, OCON

SUBJECT: BELGRADE CSCE--ALLIED DISCUSSION OF SOVIET PROPOSALS
ON SECURITY FORUM AND LIMITING MANEUVER SIZE

REF: A) STATE 271723; B) BELGRADE 7925; C) BELGRADE 7400;
D) MBFR VIENNA 0579; E) BELGRADE 7808

1. SUMMARY: UK, FRG AND FRANCE HAVE EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO
SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR "SPECIAL JOINT CONSULTATIONS" ON SECURITY
QUESTIONS FOLLOWING BELGRADE. NO ALLY HAS INDICATED SUPPORT
AND COMMON OPINION SEEMS TO BE THAT PROPOSED FORUM WOULD
SERVE SOVIET PROPAGANDA INTERESTS. WE THINK PROBING FOR
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DETAILS IN WORKING BODY DISCUSSION, AS SUGGESTED REF A, WOULD
IMPLY INTEREST AND BE TACTICALLY UNWISE. WE ALSO BELIEVE US
SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO AGREEING TO POST-
BELGRADE CMBS WORKING GROUP AS AN ALTERNATIVE. MOST ALLIED
DELS REMAIN WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON SOVIET PROPOSAL TO
LIMIT SIZE OF MANEUVERS. FRG HAS INDICATED INTEREST IF
OBLIGATION COULD BE MADE MORE BINDING THAN OTHERS IN

CSCE AND COULD APPLY TO ALL OF SOVIET EUROPE; SOVIETS HAVE TOLD GERMANS LATTER IS IMPOSSIBLE. FRENCH HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR PRINCIPLED OPPOSITION TO THE PROPOSAL, WHICH THEY SEE AS BEARING UPON MILITARY SECURITY AND HENCE OUTSIDE PROVINCE OF CSCE. END SUMMARY.

2. NATO CBMS CAUCUS NOVEMBER 15 DISCUSSED SOVIET PROPOSALS TO LIMIT SIZE OF MANEUVERS AND HOLD "SPECIAL JOINT CONSULTATIONS" ON SECURITY QUESTIONS FOLLOWING BELGRADE.

3. US REP REVIEWED CONSIDERATIONS OUTLINED PARAS E AND F(1)-(4) OF REF A. HE SAID USG ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO ALLIED VIEWS ON THESE PROPOSALS AND WOULD TAKE THEM FULLY INTO ACCOUNT IN FURTHER DEVELOPING ITS OWN THINKING.

4. FRG REP SAID HIS GOVERNMENT, LIKE USG, HAD NOT YET REACHED DEFINITE CONCLUDING ABOUT MANEUVER-CEILING PROPOSAL. THERE SEEMED TO BE TWO VIEWS IN BONN: ONE, THAT AGREEING TO SOVIET PROPOSAL AT BELGRADE WOULD FACILITATE NEGOTIATION OF STABILIZING MEASURES IN MBFR; THE OTHER, THAT A NON-BINDING AGREEMENT OF THE CHARACTER THAT COULD BE NEGOTIATED IN BELGRADE WOULD BE USELESS, EITHER IN ITSELF OR AS A PRECEDENT FOR VIENNA. ON INSTRUCTION, HIS DELEGATION HAS "QUIETLY" SOUNDED SOVIETS OUT ABOUT DETAILS, PARTICULARLY ABOUT WHETHER THEY COULD CONFIDENTIAL

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AGREE TO SOME MORE BINDING FORM OF COMMITMENT THAN EXISTS WITH RESPECT TO PRESENT CSCE OBLIGATIONS AND WHETHER THEY COULD ACCEPT APPLICATION OF MANEUVER-SIZE LIMIT TO ALL OF EUROPE WEST OF THE URALS. FRG REP SAID SOVS HAD INDICATED FLEXIBILITY ON THE FIRST POINT BUT NONE ON THE SECOND: THEY COULD ACCEPT NO RESTRICTION BEYOND 250 KILOMETER ZONE OF THEIR TERRITORY COVERED BY THE MAJOR MANEUVER NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT. FRG REP TOLD CAUCUS HE DOUBTED HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE INTERESTED IF SOVIETS REMAINED FIRM ON THIS POINT.

5. SEVERAL REPS (FRENCH, DUTCH, NORWEGIAN, US) QUESTIONED FRG REP ABOUT IDEA OF A STRONGER OBLIGATION, WHICH WOULD IMPINGE ONLY ON ALLIED PRACTICES AND NOT THOSE OF THE WARSAW PACT AND WHICH MIGHT RISK DEVALUING EXISTING CSCE OBLIGATIONS. FRG REP ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE HAD NO PRECISE IDEA WHAT MORE BINDING OBLIGATION MIGHT ENTAIL.

6. FRG REP SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT HIS GOVERNMENT COULD NOT ACCEPT SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR "SPECIAL JOINT CONSULTATIONS". HE SAID SOVIETS, IN DISCUSSING PROPOSAL, HAD MADE CLEAR THAT WHAT THEY ENVISAGED WAS "POLITICAL"

CONSULTATIONS, NOT TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS AMONG EXPERTS.

7. UK REP REPORTED THAT HIS DELEGATIONS'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO OPPOSE "SPECIAL JOINT CONSULTATIONS" AND URGE THAT CBM PROPOSALS TABLED HERE BE DEALT WITH HERE, NOT ELSEWHERE. ON MANEUVER-CEILING PROPOSAL, HE SAID LONDON WAS AWAITING RESULTS OF NATO POLADS DISCUSSION NOVEMBER 15 AS WELL AS SECOND IMS PAPER ON THE SUBJECT. IN LATER PRIVATE CONVERSATION AFTER CAUCUS, UK REP SAID HE HAD SEEN LITTLE INDICATION IN CABLES EXCHANGED BETWEEN LONDON AND UK MBFR DEL THAT UK GOVERNMENT WAS PERSUADED BY MBFR DEL'S ARGUMENT THAT ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET PROPOSAL IN CSCE WOULD ADVANCE WEST'S INTERESTS IN VIENNA.

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8. BELGIAN REP SAID HE TOO HAD NO FIRM INSTRUCTIONS ON MANEUVER-SIZE PROPOSAL BUT THAT COMMENTS HE HAD RECEIVED FROM BRUSSELS (SIMILAR TO BELGIAN COMMENTS REPORTED BY USNATO) SEEMED HEAVILY WEIGHTED AGAINST IT.

9. FRENCH REP SAID THAT IN DEFERENCE TO ALLIED COLLEAGUES (REF B) HE HAD WEAKENED PLANNED STATEMENT OPPOSING MANEUVER-CEILING PROPOSALS IN SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY SPEECH NOVEMBER 11, DROPPING AN ENTIRE PARAGRAPH AND SAYING ONLY THAT, AS A RESTRICTION ON MILITARY ACTIVITY, THE MEASURE PROPOSED WOULD "SEEM" TO FALL OUTSIDE COMPETENCE OF CSCE. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT BARGAIN IN BELGRADE ON ISSUES WHICH COULD AFFECT MILITARY SECURITY, WHATEVER THE TACTICAL ADVANTAGES OF DOING SO MIGHT BE. WHILE THE CEILING PROPOSED (50-60 THOUSAND) WOULD NOT IMPINGE UPON FRENCH ACTIVITY, AGREEING TO IT WOULD ESTABLISH A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT. AT THE NEXT CONFERENCE, THE PROPOSAL MIGHT BE TO DROP THE CEILING TO 25,000.

10 DEPUTY HEAD OF CANADIAN DEL, WHO HAD EARLIER EXPRESSED INFORMAL INTEREST IN POSSIBLE TACTICAL UTILITY OF SUPPORTING SOME VERSION OF SOVIET MANEUVER PROPOSAL, WAS ABSENT, AND NORWEGIAN, WHO HAD EXPRESSED SIMILAR INFORMAL INTEREST, MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT. CAUCUS WILL DISCUSS SOVIET PROPOSALS AGAIN FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 18, HOPEFULLY WITH BENEFIT OF REPORTS OF BRUSSELS DISCUSSION NOVEMBER 15, SECOND IMS PAPER AND FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM CAPITALS.

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ACTION EUR-12

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L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 PRS-01
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USIE-00 INRE-00 HA-05 CU-04 /085 W
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O P 171200Z NOV 77
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3598
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY
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11. COMMENTS:

A. GIVEN FRENCH POSITION, POSSIBILITY OF ALLIED AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT SOVIET MANEUVER-CEILING PROPOSAL SEEMS REMOTE. STATEMENTS OF BELGIANS HERE AND AT NATO INDICATE THEY SHARE FRENCH APPREHENSIONS, AND A NUMBER OF OTHER ALLIED REPS, SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS (REF C), HAVE EXPRESSED SIMILAR VIEWS.

B. TWO POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO ACCEPTANCE OR OUTRIGHT REJECTION OF SOVIET MANEUVER PROPOSAL WOULD BE:

A) TO PROPOSE, INSTEAD OF A RESTRICTION ON MANEUVER SIZE, A STATEMENT OF INTENT NOT TO HOLD MANEUVERS ABOVE A GIVEN SIZE (PERHAPS MEETING THE FRENCH OBJECTION); OR

B) TO WELCOME SOVIET INTEREST IN LIMITING MANEUVER SIZE BUT ARGUE THAT PROPOSAL WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE FOR CONSIDERATION IN MBFR (REFS C AND D). NEITHER OF THESE
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POSSIBILITIES HAS YET BEEN EXPLORED IN NATO CBMS CAUCUS.

C) WE HAVE YET SEEN NO INDICATION OF ALLIED INTEREST IN "SPECIAL JOINT CONSULTATIONS". FRG, UK AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS HAVE STATED THEIR OPPOSITION, THE FRENCH IN WORKING BODY DEBATE. COMMON OPINION AMONG ALLIED CBM

EXPERTS SEEMS TO BE THAT PROPOSED FORUM WOULD SERVE SOVIET PROPAGANDA INTERESTS AND PERHAPS THREATEN CSCE. IN NOVEMBER 15 CMBS CAUCUS US REP REPORTED US INTEREST (PARA E, REF A) IN FULL EXAMINATION OF IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSAL FOR CSCE AND OTHER NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THIS LED TO NO REAL DISCUSSION. THE DIS-ADVANTAGES HAD ALREADY BEEN POINTED OUT, AND NO ONE SEEMED TO HAVE PERCEIVED ANY ADVANTAGES.

D) WE THINK PROBING FOR DETAILS OF THIS ELEMENT OF SOVIET PROPOSAL, AS SUGGESTED PARA E OF REF A, WOULD RISK IMPLYING INTEREST IN IT AND ENHANCING ITS STANDING IN EYES OF SOME NNAS. UNLESS DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTS OTHERWISE, WE WOULD PLAN TO IGNORE SOVIET INSTITUTIONAL PROPOSAL AS LONG AS WE CAN AND CONCENTRATE ON SPECIFIC CBMS AND OTHER SECURITY MEASURES WHICH HAVE BEEN PRESENTED FOR CONSIDERATION HERE. AS WE SUGGESTED IN REF E, SOME NNAS, AS WELL AS NORWAY, MAY HOPE AT APPROPRIATE POINT TO BE ABLE TO CHANNEL SOVIET INTEREST IN "SPECIAL JOINT CONSULTATIONS" INTO SUPPORT FOR POST-BELGRADE WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS ON CBMS. IF AT THAT POINT, ALLIES WERE TO OPPOSE WORKING GROUP IDEA, SOVIET PROPOSAL COULD BECOME MORE ATTRACTIVE TO NNAS AS AN ALTERNATIVE. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE US SHOULD BE PREPARED TO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER SUCH AN EXPERTS GROUP IF IT IS CAREFULLY MANDATED TO DEAL WITH SPECIFIC CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH THE CONFERENCE CAN AGREE REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY AND IF IT IS GIVEN A FIXED PERIOD IN WHICH TO DO ITS WORK. WE DO NOT EXPECT NNAS TO RAISE THIS SUBJECT SOON, HOWEVER, FOR FEAR OF DIVERTING FROM SERIOUS TREATMENT OF CBM PROPOSALS HERE AT BELGRADE.

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